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When	EU	university	researchers	lost	the	full	rights	to
their	innovations
University	workers	contribute	not	only	through	research	and	teaching	activities,	but	may	also	start	successful	high-
technology	companies	(e.g.,	Google	and	Genentech)	and	create	valuable	intellectual	property	(e.g.,	the	Hepatitis	B
vaccine	and	the	pain	medication	Lyrica).	Moreover,	universities	can	be	important	foundations	for	local	innovation
clusters,	such	as	Silicon	Valley	(Bresnahan	et	al.,	2001).
Several	European	countries,	observing	the	growth	in	university	patenting	in	the	United	States	in	the	last	several
decades	(Mowery	et	al.	2004),	in	the	early	2000s	enacted	legislation	seeking	to	emulate	the	U.S.	system	(Lissoni	et
al.	2008).	Prior	to	the	reform,	a	university	researcher	retained	blanket	rights	to	his	or	her	invention,	the	so-called
“professor’s	privilege”,	while	post-reform	the	university	typically	got	two-thirds	of	the	income	rights	–	a	system	similar
to	in	the	U.S.	and	many	other	countries	(Lissoni	et	al.	2008).
In	a	recent	paper,	we	use	comprehensive	data	about	workers,	businesses,	and	patents,	to	analyse	the	impact	of	the
reform	in	Norway.	The	figure	plots	the	difference	in	per	capita	startup	rates	for	university	researchers	and	non-
university	employees	for	three	years	prior	to	the	reform,	enacted	January	1st	2003,	and	five	years	post-reform.
The	figure	shows	that,	post-reform,	university	researcher	startup	activity	dropped	by	about	50	per	cent.	By
comparison,	as	can	also	be	seen	in	the	figure,	the	background	rate	of	startups	in	Norway	as	a	whole	did	not	change.
The	sharp,	relative	decline	among	university	researchers	is	similarly	found	when	they	are	compared	against
individuals	with	increasingly	similar	sociodemographic	characteristics	(e.g.,	individuals	with	a	Ph.D.).	The	results	for
patenting	activity	are	similar,	suggesting	an	approximate	50	per	cent	decline	in	patents	per	university	researcher
compared	to	the	patenting	rate	among	non-university	inventors.
One	explanation	for	the	decline	might	be	a	lack	of	experience	among	universities:	newly	instituted	technology
transfer	offices	(TTOs)	at	the	universities	may	have	been	initially	unskilled	at	commercialisation	and	needed	time	to
improve.	However,	even	four	years	after	the	reform,	there	seems	to	be	no	sign	of	improvement;	the	negative	effect	of
the	reform	appears	to	continue,	as	illustrated	by	the	figure.	In	the	patenting	analysis,	we	can	follow	university
researchers	until	seven	years	post-reform	and	the	same	picture	emerges;	there	is	no	bounce-back	and,	if	anything,
commercialisation	rates	appear	to	decline	with	additional	time.
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Another	explanation	for	our	findings	could	be	that	the	reform	eliminated	the	less-promising	start-ups	and	patents,	so
that	although	the	quantity	of	university-based	innovation	went	down	post-reform,	the	quality	went	up.	The	data,
however,	suggest	that	the	quality	also	declined.	After	the	reform,	startups	by	university	researchers	become	less
likely	to	survive	and	grow	more	slowly.	Meanwhile,	university-based	patents	receive	fewer	citations.	Thus,	not	only
does	the	quantity	of	commercialisations	by	university	researchers	decline,	but	there	are	declines	in	several	quality
measures	as	well.
A	theoretical	perspective	that	may	explain	the	findings	emphasises	the	problem	of	university	researcher	incentives,
and	how	these	can	be	balanced	with	any	rights	given	to	the	university	itself.	How	to	balance	ownership	rights
between	investing	parties	is	a	classic	question	in	economics	and	also	provides	canonical	perspectives	in	studies	of
innovation	(Holmstrom	1982,	Grossman	and	Hart	1986,	Aghion	and	Tirole	1994,	Green	and	Scotchmer	1995).
The	professor’s	privilege	reform	is	a	large	shock	to	the	rights	regime.	Recognising	the	potential	importance	of
investments	by	both	the	university	researcher	and	the	university	itself,	one	can	motivate	a	royalty	sharing	regime	that
favours	balancing	rights	across	parties	rather	than	giving	all	royalties	to	one	party,	as	under	the	professor’s	privilege.
The	basic	presumption	here	is	that	university-level	investments	are	important	and	cannot	be	easily	replicated	by	the
university	researcher.	However,	under	circumstances	where	the	university-level	investments	are	much	less	important
than	researcher-level	investments,	royalty	shares	would	be	optimally	balanced	toward	the	university	researcher.
Our	stark	empirical	findings	appear	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	motivations	behind	the	Norwegian	policy	reform.	The
findings	may	also	raise	questions	about	similar	reforms	in	other	European	countries	that	eliminated	the	professor’s
privilege:	were	the	Norwegian	results	representative,	one	would	imagine	that	the	quantity	of	start-ups	and	patenting
by	university	researchers	would	rise	substantially,	as	would	the	quality,	should	universities	give	the	researchers	full
rights.	Since	the	post-reform	regime	looks	like	the	U.S.	regime,	among	others,	the	interest	in	the	external	validity	of
these	findings	may	also	extend	to	countries	outside	Europe.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	University	Innovation	and	the	Professor’s	Privilege,	American
Economic	Review,	July	2018.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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